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1. Introduction
In many countries, measuring the efficiency of health care services has 
become increasingly important since the early 1980s. In Italy, the devolution 
of the National Health Service (NHS) to regional governments, started in 
2001 but not yet fully implemented, and the definition of national basic lev-
els of public health care to be provided by each regional health care system 
has made it crucial to compare the relative performance of health care serv-
ices both across different regions and across different Local Health Authori-
ties (LHA) within each region.
In this paper, we focus on measuring the technical efficiency of acute 
hospitals operating within a NHS, which provide important services within 
the basic package of public health care. To this purpose, we develop four 
DEA models to measure the levels of technical efficiency of 85 acute hospi-
tals in Veneto, a region in Northern Italy. The empirical analysis allows us to 
evaluate the role of demand and weight restrictions and will provide some 
useful insights into the levels of efficiency of hospitals.
The plan of the paper is the following. Section 2 briefly describes the 
main characteristics of DEA as a technique for measuring hospital technical 
efficiency. In section 3 we argue that precise value judgements are necessary 
in order to apply this method to the efficiency evaluation of hospitals operat-
ing within a National Health Service (NHS). These value judgements con-
cern particularly the production technology and managers’ or policy-makers’ 
preferences for hospital output mix, and imply the adoption of constraints 
on input and/or on output weights. In section 4 we analyse the importance 
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of distinguishing between different components of the technical inefficiency 
of hospitals operating within an NHS: internal inefficiency attributable to the 
responsibility of hospital management and external inefficiency that could be 
due to past health care policy decisions and to exogenous demand. In section 
5, the DEA method is applied to measure the levels of technical efficiency of 
the hospitals in Veneto. Finally, section 6 reports some conclusions.
2. Some issues on measuring hospital technical efficiency
The technical efficiency of hospitals can be measured by parametric and 
non-parametric evaluation methods that permit simultaneous comparison of 
the inputs and outputs of a hospital’s production process and produce concise 
indicators of efficiency. Both methods allow to consider the heterogeneous 
character of the output produced by different decision-making units (DMUs) 
and are particularly well-suited for developing indicators to compare the effi-
ciency of different hospitals. Since each method is based on different hypoth-
eses with differing degrees of stringency, they will lead to different (sometimes 
contrasting) results regarding the efficiency levels of the hospitals examined. 
Parametric analyses require a prior definition of a production function of hos-
pital services, whereas the non-parametric analyses determine the relative ef-
ficiency scores of similar DMUs by means of linear programming techniques, 
without detailed descriptions of their production processes  1.
We will focus on a particular non-parametric method, Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA), which is encountering growing consensus as a powerful tool 
to measure hospital productivity. As it uses a particular type of linear pro-
gramming, DEA makes it possible to determine the relative efficiency levels 
of similar hospitals without the need for a detailed description of the pro-
duction process (i.e. without determining beforehand a certain number of 
parameters in order to explain the structure of the whole production proc-
ess)  2. Given the multiple input-output nature of hospital production proc-
1 For a comparison between parametric and non-parametric methods, see: Banker, Con-
rad and Strauss (1986), Chirikos and Sear (2000), Jacobs (2001).
2 Detailed descriptions of DEA can be found in several sources (Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes, 1978; Charnes et al., 1994; Ganley and Cubbin, 1992; Cooper, Seiford and Tone, 
2007). An extensive review of DEA applications in the area of health care is given by Holling-
sworth, Dawson and Maniadakis (1999). For some recent interesting applications of DEA to 
hospital efficiency evaluation, see: O’Neill (1998), Puig-Junoy (2000), Steinmann and Zweifel 
(2003), Ventura, Gonzalez and Carcaba (2004). A complete survey of DEA studies on the ef-
ficiency of Italian hospitals is given by Canta, Piacenza and Turati (2006).
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ess, the use of DEA is appropriate because it allows the heterogeneity of de-
livered outputs to be taken into account. Moreover, DEA is particularly use-
ful when input prices are not available and therefore it is impossible to esti-
mate a hospital cost function. This is the case of most Italian NHS hospitals, 
whose costs are generally embedded in the Local Health Authorities’ costs 
and for which it would be unpracticable to assign a price to each used input. 
Finally, DEA does not require a single objective function to be defined for 
all DMUs. On the contrary, DEA defines efficiency as the ratio between a 
weighted sum of outputs and a weighted sum of inputs and it allows each 
DMU to choose the preferred weights to attach to inputs and outputs in or-
der to maximise its efficiency ratio with respect to the other DMUs.
As Allen et al. (1997) pointed out, the flexibility of DEA may be brought 
into question when it is considered that the correct evaluation of the rela-
tive efficiency of hospitals may require the consideration of value judgements 
which can restrict the acceptable ranges of variation of the input and output 
weights. In fact, since the outputs provided by hospital services are usually 
included in the basic levels of public health care, the evaluation of the relative 
efficiency of hospitals should take into account the policy-maker’s preferences. 
This implies imposing particular constraints on input and output weights.
Another issue that has often been neglected is the influence of variables 
outside the direct control of hospital management on hospital performance. 
In particular, we will show that the level of technical inefficiency observable 
using DEA can be broken down into internal inefficiency (attributable to hos-
pital managers) and external inefficiency due both to an excess of supply with 
respect to demand and to scale inefficiencies. If these external inefficiency 
factors arise from past choices of health care planners, they should be consid-
ered exogenous with respect to the decisions of the hospital management.
In the following sections, we show how both the choice of specific con-
straints on input and output weights (in accordance with health care policy-
makers’ preferences) and the consideration of exogenous variables outside the 
control of hospital management (exogenous demand, past policy-makers’ de-
cisions) can affect the measurement of hospital technical efficiency with DEA.
3. The need for value judgements and DEA weight restrictions
The great flexibility in selecting optimal weights is a particular feature of 
DEA and is often wrongly confused with absolute lack of a priori hypotheses 
on the form of the production function of DMUs but we should not ignore the 
fact that the acceptable range of weights can vary according to the perspective of 
analysis that is adopted. At one extreme, a hospital management perspective can 
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be adopted, that is, maximum freedom when choosing weights  3. At the other 
extreme, a complete centralised perspective can be adopted in which input and 
output weights are determined univocally. In this case, however, the DEA loses 
its significance as it is reduced to the traditional type of analysis where each hos-
pital’s efficiency is measured as the ratio between weighted aggregations of se-
lected outputs and inputs. At an intermediate level the relevant authority (e.g. 
a national or regional health care authority within an NHS) can set maximum 
and minimum boundaries for some or for all the weights, defining the accepta-
ble range of variations of the weights that each DMU can choose. In this case, a 
constrained DEA model is applied according to the targets of the policy-maker  4.
Since many hospital services are considered of great social value, it is inevi-
table that to some extent the evaluations of relative efficiency of hospitals will 
be conditioned by value judgements.
Following Allen et al. (1997), value judgements concerning the relative 
importance of inputs and outputs can be incorporated in the DEA model, 
via weight restrictions, according to three broad approaches having different 
implications on the assessed relative efficiency of hospitals:
1) imposing direct restrictions on the weights of some or all inputs and 
outputs. This approach can be applied in two ways:
i) absolute weight restrictions, by imposing lower and upper bounds to 
weights;
ii) assurance region methods, which impose constraints on the marginal 
rates of substitution between inputs or outputs (defined by the ratio between 
input or output weights);
2) adjusting the observed input-output levels (cone-ratio approaches);
3) restricting the virtual weights of inputs and/or outputs  5. For example, 
defining uk the weight attached to the k-th output, the virtual weight for out-
put yk of hospital j – which defines the proportion of the total virtual out-
put of DMU j devoted to output k, and is expressed as 
 
(ukj ykj )/( ukj ykj )k =1
K∑  
– could be restricted within a given range  6.
3 However, a value judgement is implicitly formulated as the implicit weights chosen by 
each hospital are considered acceptable. The issue of using acceptable weights for input or 
output is analysed by Jacobs, Smith and Street (2006), chapters 5 and 8.
4 Allen et al. (1997) calls the single hospital perspective a «bottom up» approach and the 
policy-maker perspective a «top down» approach.
5 Constraints on virtual weights are less binding than constraints on absolute weights. 
In fact, the latter determine a unique assurance region for all DMUs, while the former allow 
DMUs to choose the absolute weights that guarantee their best assurance region.
6 See Pedraja-Chaparro, Salinas-Jimenez and Smith (1997), Charnes et al. (1994) and 
Cooper, Seiford and Tone (2007) for further reading on the role and implications of weight 
restrictions in DEA.
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The bounds used in weight restrictions can be either exogenously set ac-
cording to policy-maker (or top management) objectives, expert opinion and 
price/cost information (where available) or endogenously derived from the 
data. In the latter case, running an unbounded DEA at the first stage could 
provide useful information for definition of the weight restrictions to use in 
the constrained DEA at the second stage  7.
4.  The role of demand and of scale efficiency in the performance of NHS ho-
spitals
If the set of hospitals under examination includes units with excess sup-
ply with respect to demand, then the analysis of efficiency should capture 
this effect. In an NHS, an excess supply of hospital services could be due 
to past decisions of health care policy-makers, determining over-sizing of ca-
pacity with respect to actual demand with a negative influence on DEA effi-
ciency scores. This particular source of inefficiency can be defined as demand 
inefficiency. Moreover, if we consider the hospitals operating within an NHS 
(which make their decisions according to national and regional health care 
authorities’ guidelines), health care policy-makers could also be responsible, 
at least partly, for another source of inefficiency, i.e. scale inefficiency, arising 
from over- or under-sizing of hospitals with respect to their actual activity 
levels.
Both these sources of inefficiency can exist in the short term and can be 
considered, somehow, «external» to NHS hospitals’ management responsibil-
ity, being determined in most cases by the decisions of health care planners  8. 
In fact, within an NHS, a hospital could be kept active for reasons re-
garding broader health care policy, even if it exhibits a non-optimal bed ca-
pacity, high levels of potential production and insufficient demand.  9
In this case, an NHS hospital could operate efficiently given the actual de-
mand for its services (internal technical efficiency), but at the same time it could 
7 For example, Chilingerian and Sherman (1997) obtained optimal weights for inputs and 
outputs of primary care physicians with an unbounded DEA, at the first stage, and then used 
these weights to define a cone-ratio in a subsequent bounded DEA model based on HMO 
management’s objectives.
8 The problem of considering environmental constraints outside the management control 
is considered by Jacobs, Smith and Street (2006), chapter 8.
9 For example, consider hospitals in poorly-served areas – such as islands, mountainous 
districts and other peripheral and low population density areas – which, if closed, would force 
people to travel long distances or face long waiting lists.
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show external technical inefficiency (both scale and demand inefficiency), as its 
size is non-optimal and its input endowments are excessive in relation to actual 
demand. While the external inefficiency of public NHS hospitals can be due 
to decisions taken by national and regional policy-makers at a higher level than 
hospital management, private hospitals (for-profit and non-profit) operating 
within an NHS could be publicly subsidized in order to operate with a given 
(non-optimal) capacity and in a given (low demand) area. In both cases, scale 
inefficiency and demand inefficiency can be attributed to the responsibility of 
policy-makers and are therefore external to the hospital management.
The point can be further explained with the help of Figure 1, where we 
consider a very simple production process (one output y, acute care admis-
sions, obtained via the utilization of one input x, the number of beds). In 
Figure 1 we show the frontier production function (FPF) for a given set of 
hospitals, describing the highest level of output y attainable via an efficient 
utilization of input x, and the observed production function (OPFj) of a given 
hospital j  10. In the example of Figure 1, we consider the existence of an ex-
pressed admissions demand yL lower than the number of admissions that can 
be satisfied by the hospital, considering its OPFj.
When the hospital capacity xj is above the optimal size (x*), total ineffi-
ciency can be split into three components:
1) scale inefficiency (the distance between the dotted line OM, linking 
the origin to point M that defines the optimal output with respect to actual 
capacity x j, and the FPF, i.e. yM(x j)- yF(x j));
2) internal inefficiency (the distance between FPF and OPFj, i.e. 
yF(x j) – yj(x j));
3) and demand inefficiency (the distance between OPFj and the line yL, 
i.e. yj(x j) – yL).
If we consider hospitals operating within an NHS, the first and the third 
components of inefficiency can be considered as external source of ineffi-
ciency because they can be, at least in the short run, outside the control of 
hospital management.
Using DEA, it is possible to provide evidence of both sources of exter-
nal inefficiency. External scale inefficiency (due to a non-optimal hospital size) 
can be measured by introducing the assumption of variable returns to scale 
(VRS), as in the BCC model (Banker, Charnes and Cooper 1984). On the 
other hand, measuring external demand inefficiency (due to a shortage of 
expressed demand with respect to supply) should take account of the exist-
10 Figure 1 is used here just for explanatory purposes, while in the DEA the production 
frontier would be represented by a piecewise line.
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ence of an additional constraint on the demand side. This can be done by 
adding to the BCC-DEA model a non-discretionary input variable represent-
ing the expressed demand level, such as yL in Figure 1. The consideration of 
an additional exogenous demand input in BCC-DEA can be made follow-
ing Cooper-Seiford-Tone’s approach to the treatment of a non-controllable 
(NCN) variable (Cooper, Seiford and Tone, 2007, chapter 7)  11. A possible 
choice (that we adopt in the next section) could be to approximate the non-
discretionary level of expressed demand yL by considering the actual number 
of hospital admissions. This is clearly an unsatisfactory choice, since the satis-
fied demand is undoubtedly influenced by the hospital’s production process.
In any case, it is worth noting that the number of admissions (satisfied 
demand) cannot be larger than the expressed demand. Therefore, by using 
the satisfied demand as a NCN variable, two cases could arise:
– the hospital does not show demand inefficiency, so that we can surely 
state that it would not be demand inefficient even though the expressed de-
11 Obviously, considering an additional input will tend to increase the number of efficient 
hospitals.
FIG. 1. Components of hospital total inefficiency.
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mand has been used; in this case, the only source of external inefficiency 
would be given by scale inefficiency;
– the hospital shows demand inefficiency: in this case we cannot surely 
state that this inefficiency is completely external, as the actual demand can 
be partially influenced by managers’ behaviour.
Therefore, the use of the satisfied demand as an additional input can 
provide some useful information about the existence of environmental con-
straints influencing hospital efficiency.
Summing up, by using a Constant Return to Scale (CRS) model, a VRS 
model and then including an NCN demand variable, it is possible to compute:
– total technical efficiency scores with CRS: ej ;
– total technical efficiency scores with VRS: e Sj ;
– internal technical efficiency scores with VRS-NCN, e Ij , which signals the 
ability of the hospital management to apply the most efficient production 
technique.
As the efficiency scores vary from 0 to 1, the total inefficiency of a hospi-
tal j, (1 – ej), can be considered as the result of three components  12:
– internal inefficiency due only to hospital management, computed as 
(1 – e Ij  );
– external scale inefficiency, computed as the difference between total ef-
ficiency with VRS and total efficiency with CRS: (e Sj  – ej);
– external demand inefficiency, computed as the difference between inter-
nal efficiency with VRS and total efficiency with VRS: (e Ij  – e Sj  ).
5. A case study: the hospitals of the Veneto Region – Italy
5.1. The model
Let’s examine the effect of what we have discussed so far using data con-
cerning the acute hospitals in Veneto, a region in Northern Italy.
The hospital technology is described by a simplified model with three 
outputs:
– an index of in-patient output calculated by weighting the number of 
acute care discharges with DRG weights (y1);
– the number of days of treatment in day hospital (y2);
12 Three different components of inefficiency can be measured by comparing the scores 
obtained with three different DEA models: the CCR model (Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 
1978); the BCC model; the Non-Controllable Variable BCC model. See Cooper, Seiford and 
Tone (2007). In section 5, we will adopt this methodology.
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– the number of treatments provided by emergency services (y3);
and five inputs:
– the number of physicians (x1);
– the number of nurses (x2);
– the number of other employees (x3);
– the number of hospital beds (x4);
– the total number of acute care admissions, additional input used as a 
proxy for hospital demand (x5).
Output y1 is built as a weighted sum of medical and surgical discharges 
differentiated by DRG (excluding day hospital cases). As aggregation 
weights, we use the relative standard costs (DRG tariffs) attached to each 
DRG, considered as proxies of the intensity of care embodied in each dis-
charge classified in that DRG  13. We choose weighted hospital discharges 
instead of patient days in order to avoid the incorporation of the length of 
stay in the measurement of in-patient activities, since this would penalize a 
possible substitution between length of stay and intensity of resource use  14. 
Output y2 is given by the number of days of treatment provided by medi-
cal and surgical day-hospital services. Output y3 is the number of treatments 
provided by accident and emergency services.
We should argue that the chosen measures of hospital production rep-
resent only intermediate outputs, while the final output should be linked to 
the health improvement of patients and should be correlated to the quality of 
hospital care (Bloor and Maynard, 2006). Including measures of final outcome 
and of quality of care among the outputs (e.g. survival rates, readmission rates, 
or the incidence of hospital-acquired infections used as proxies for the quality 
of care) is often very problematic, either because of the lack of data or because 
of the difficulty in making a proper assessment of the available data  15.
13 The DRG classification includes 492 categories, as in the 10th version of HCFA-DRG 
in the U.S.
14 The theoretical inappropriatness of choosing in-patient days as output measure is ar-
gued by Feldstein (1967). In a recent work, Steinmann and Zweifel (2003), recognizing that 
the role of patient days in the hospital service production is rather ambiguous, consider two 
different DEA models: in the first, in-patient days are viewed as an input from a social point 
of view; in the second, adopting a hospital manager’s viewpoint, in-patient days constitute an 
output as long as they form the basis of payment.
15 A first attempt in this direction, with reference to Italian hospitals aggregated at re-
gional level, has been made by Cellini et al. (2000) who included the total number of dis-
charged patients among the inputs, and the number of patients discharged alive among the 
outputs. However, even Cellini et al. (2000) pointed out that this approach does not seem 
completely satisfactory since mortality rates depend not only on the quality of hospital care, 
but on many other factors totally out of control of hospitals.
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Unfortunately, hospital records did not provide us any data about variables 
which could be related to quality of care. Therefore, our analysis provides only 
measures of technical efficiency of hospital production and should be consid-
ered just a first step within a complete evaluation process of the performances 
of Veneto hospitals, which would require a deeper analysis at DMU level.
The staff numbers (x1, x2, and x3) are measured as the average number 
of full-time equivalent staff for the year, while the number of beds (x4) is a 
proxy of the capital used in the hospital production process. Finally, the ad-
ditional input x5 represents a non-controllable demand variable introduced in 
order to separate total technical efficiency into its internal (managerial) and 
external components, according to the analysis in section 4.
We consider four different DEA models reported in Table 1.
In model 2, the following restriction on the virtual weights of output y1 
(acute care discharges adjusted with DRG) is imposed for each hospital j  16:
 
(u1 j y1 j )/( ukj ykj )k =1
3∑ ≥ 0,7
i.e., each hospital cannot attribute a virtual weight lower than 70% to output y1. 
This allows us to make efficiency evaluations that are more focused on output 
y1, considered a priority, while it penalises the hospitals that specialise in other 
outputs. The particular choice of the lower bound of 70% can be justified by 
16 As explained in section 3, constraints on virtual weights are less binding than restric-
tions on absolute weights.
TAB. 1. The analysed DEA models
Model Orientation Return to 
scale
Technical 
efficiency
Constraints Responsibility for technical 
inefficiency
1 (CCR) Input 
Output*
Constant 
(CRS)
Total None Hospital management and
Policy-maker
2 (CCR) Output Constant 
(CRS)
Total Virtual weight of 
output y1 ≥ 70%
Hospital management and
Policy-maker
3 (BCC) Input Variable 
(VRS)
Total None Hospital management and
Policy-maker
4 (BCC-NCN) Input Variable 
(VRS)
Internal 
(addition of 
input x5)
None Hospital management
Notes: * Results obtained either with input-oriented or output-oriented CCR model are equivalent.
a) CCR model: Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 1978;
b) BCC model: Banker, Charnes and Cooper, 1984;
c) BCC-NCN model: BCC model modified with a non-controllable (NCN) variable (Cooper, Seiford 
and Tone, 2007, chapter 7).
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two different arguments. Firstly, the output virtual weights that can be cho-
sen by each hospital should not be too far from the virtual weight chosen by a 
DMU built as the aggregate of the Veneto hospitals under evaluation («Veneto» 
DMU) that can be interpreted as an implicit expression of the Veneto Region’s 
preferences concerning the relative importance of different outputs. The aver-
age virtual weight of output y1, calculated for Veneto DMU in model 1 is 86%. 
This high value indicates that the virtual weight of acute care discharges should 
be sufficiently high in order to incorporate the relative importance attached to 
this output in the hospital production process. Secondly, it should be noted that 
the more recent health care policy of the Veneto Region gives incentives to shift 
hospital production from traditional forms of in-patient care (here represented 
by y1) towards other types of outputs, such as day hospital services, that can 
increase the appropriateness and decrease the costs of the hospitals’ production 
process. Consequently, the virtual weights of y1 should be lower than 86% in 
order to guarantee that each hospital does not overlook other outputs. Sum-
ming up, the restriction we adopt on the virtual weights of output y1 could be 
considered a reasonable compromise between these two arguments.
5.2. The data
The data used for the analysis refer to the year 1997 and come from the 
hospital discharge records of the Ministry of Health and the Veneto Region 
databases (Regione Veneto, 1999). Due to the lack of some information, the 
sample does not include all the Region’s public and private hospitals. Only 
85 structures are considered out of the 95 that actually existed. The sam-
ple consists of 59 LHA-public hospitals (i.e. hospitals directly run by Local 
Health Authorities), 2 public hospital trusts (the teaching hospitals of Padua 
and Verona) and 24 private hospitals affiliated to LHAs (seven of which are 
non-profit). As far as outputs y1 and y2 are concerned, the revenues of hospi-
tal trusts and private hospitals are based upon DRG tariffs, while LHA-pub-
lic hospitals are financed partly on a capitation basis (considering the needs 
of the population residing within each Local Health Authority’s territory) 
and partly by DRG tariffs (in order to compensate the services provided to 
patients residing outside the LHA). As regards emergency services y3, they 
are compensated by special funds on a retrospective basis.
5.3. Results and discussion
Table 2 summarizes the main results from model 1 (CRS total efficiency 
without constraints) and model 2 (CRS total efficiency with a constraint on 
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y1 virtual weights); the table shows only the data for the 26 hospitals that 
change (reduce) their efficiency score moving from model 1 to model 2. We 
observe a high variability in terms of total efficiency scores and a very low 
percentage of efficient DMUs both in model 1 (15.29%) and in model 2 
(12,94%).
In model 1 (CRS total efficiency without constraints) most hospitals exhibit 
a very high virtual weight for output y1 «discharges adjusted with DRG». In 
any case, as no constraints are imposed, it is possible to retrace some hospitals 
which exhibit a very low (or nil) virtual weight for y1, while assigning a very 
high virtual weight to the number of days in day hospital y2 or to emergency 
services y3. This is plainly unsatisfactory, as discharges are an important com-
ponent of total hospital output. Therefore, in model 2 (CRS total efficiency 
TAB. 2.  The effect of a constraint on y1 virtual weights (subset of hospitals affected by the constraint on vir-
tual weights; scores in % ranked by total efficiency level)
Hospital Total efficiency with 
CRS (model 1)
Constrained total 
efficiency with CRS 
(model 2)
Reduction of efficiency 
due to restrictions on y1 
weight (mod. 2 – mod. 1)
U68 44.6 23.7 –21.0
U25 50.6 49.4 –1.3
U79 50.9 50.8 –0.02
U54 53.2 51.8 –1.4
U20 57.2 35.0 –22.2
U29 58.6 40.0 –18.6
U75 59.6 47.7 –11.9
U40 69.8 60.9 –8.8
U41 71.3 71.2 –0.2
U44 76.0 69.9 –6.1
U10 81.3 68.3 –13.0
U27 83.8 71.1 –12.7
U31 86.9 85.6 –1.3
U51 87.3 86.7 –0.5
U32 89.9 88.5 –1.4
U26 93.6 90.9 –2.6
U50 94.5 90.0 –4.5
U06 95.6 71.9 –23.7
U78 95.6 81.0 –14.7
U66 95.8 86.2 –9.6
U24 97.3 96.5 –0.8
U76 98.6 98.4 –0.3
U90 99.2 92.4 –6.8
U67 99.7 98.2 –1.5
U07 100.0 48.4 –51.6
U21 100.0 71.2 –28.8
Number of full efficient DMUs 13 11 –2
Average 74.5 71.3 –3.1
Minimum 15.6 15.6 –51.6
Maximum 100.0 100.0 –
Range 84.4 84.4 51.6
Standard deviation 22.8 23.1 8.0
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with a constraint on y1 virtual weights) we try to overcome this shortcoming 
by imposing a constraint on the virtual weights of hospital output y1.
Table 2 shows that, after the introduction of the constraint on y1 vir-
tual weight, on average, total efficiency decreases from 74.5% (model 1) to 
71.3% (model 2). The restriction penalises the DMUs that in model 1 as-
signed a virtual weight of less than 70% to acute care discharges. Table 2 
and Figure 2 show this effect: hospitals that in the unbounded DEA (model 
1) exhibited high performances have lower efficiency scores in model 2. 
Two cases that stand out are the LHA-public hospitals U07 and U21, which 
give absolute priority to day-hospital care (with weights close to 100% in 
model 1), and which drop from total efficiency scores of 100% to 48.4% 
and 71.2% respectively. These two hospitals are highly penalised with model 
2, since with the unconstrained model 1 they assigned a weight higher than 
95% to day hospital care and a nil weight to acute care discharges. On the 
other hand, all the 17 for-profit private hospitals do not change their effi-
ciency scores, as they assign a very high weight to output y1 (for 13 of them, 
the weight attached to y1 is 100%)  17.
17 This can be easily explained, since these private hospitals do not have emergency units 
and provide mostly long-stay in-patient services.
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Table 3 compares the main results from model 1, model 3 (VRS total ef-
ficiency without constraints) and model 4 (VRS internal efficiency without 
constraints). The table shows the data for a selection of the 72 hospitals that 
change (increase) their efficiency scores moving from model 1 to model 3 
(among these DMUs, 51 increase their scores moving from model 3 to model 
TAB. 3.  Scale and demand effects on hospital efficiency scores (a selection of hospitals changing their efficiency 
scores moving from model 1 to models 3 and 4, ranked by total efficiency level; efficiency scores in %)
DMU Total 
efficiency 
with CRS 
ej (mod. 1)
Total 
efficiency 
with VRS 
e Sj (mod. 3)
Internal 
efficiency 
with VRS 
eI j (mod. 4)
Scale 
inefficiency
(e Sj – ej)
(I)
Demand 
inefficiency 
(eI j – e Sj ) 
(II)
External 
inefficiency 
(eI j – ej)
(III = I + II)
Internal 
inefficiency 
(1 – eI j ) (IV)
Total 
inefficiency 
(1 – ej)
(V = III + IV)
U83 15.6 100.0 100.0 84.4 0.0 84.4 0.0 84.4
U70 19.9 54.9 55.1 35.0 0.1 35.2 44.9 80.1
U62 24.5 67.2 80.2 42.8 12.9 55.7 19.8 75.5
U13 26.8 80.3 84.6 53.5 4.2 57.7 15.4 73.2
U69 31.7 47.7 49.0 16.0 1.3 17.3 51.0 68.3
U61 34.6 37.5 37.8 2.9 0.3 3.2 62.2 65.4
U85 35.4 70.1 70.7 34.6 0.6 35.3 29.3 64.6
U38 37.3 75.0 100.0 37.7 25.0 62.7 0.0 62.7
U72 40.2 43.1 49.3 2.9 6.2 9.1 50.7 59.8
U42 41.9 100.0 100.0 58.1 0.0 58.1 0.0 58.1
U68 44.6 45.5 100.0 0.9 54.5 55.4 0.0 55.4
… … … … … … … … …
U06 95.6 100.0 100.0 4.4 0.0 4.4 0.0 4.4
U78 95.6 96.1 100.0 0.4 3.9 4.4 0.0 4.4
U66 95.8 100.0 100.0 4.2 0.0 4.2 0.0 4.2
U24 97.3 100.0 100.0 2.7 0.0 2.7 0.0 2.7
U56 98.1 100.0 100.0 1.9 0.0 1.9 0.0 1.9
U80 98.5 100.0 100.0 1.5 0.0 1.5 0.0 1.5
U76 98.6 100.0 100.0 1.4 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.4
U90 99.2 100.0 100.0 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.8
U74 99.6 100.0 100.0 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.4
U67 99.7 99.9 100.0 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.3
Number of efficient DMUs
13 33 47
Average
74.5 86.3 90.8 11.8 4.5 16.3 9.2 25.5
Minimum
15.6 37.5 37.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Maximum
100.0 100.0 100.0 84.4 54.5 84.4 62.2 84.4
Range
84.4 62.5 62.2 84.4 54.5 84.4 62.2 84.4
Standard deviation
22.8 16.6 14.8 16.6 9.0 18.7 14.8 22.8
247
4). The total efficiency scores of model 3 are obtained running a BCC-DEA. 
Internal efficiency scores of model 4 are obtained by including among the in-
puts in the BCC-DEA a non-controllable demand variable, the total number 
of admissions x5.
Assuming VRS and using an extra non-controllable variable obviously 
lead to efficiency scores that are higher than (or equal to) those obtained for 
total efficiency. In model 1, only 13 hospitals (15.29% of the total) are effi-
cient, while 14 have an efficiency score lower than 50%. In model 3, 33 hos-
pitals (38.82% of the total) are efficient and four exhibit a score below 50%. 
In model 4, 47 hospitals (55.29% of the total) are efficient and three exhibit 
a score below 50%.
Under the assumption of VRS (model 3), we find increasing returns to 
scale (IRS) for 42 hospitals and decreasing returns to scale (DRS) for 23, 
while 20 hospitals demonstrate constant returns to scale (CRS) (seven of 
these hospitals increase their efficiency). Generally, IRS are linked to lower 
(sometimes very low) total efficiency scores, while DRS are linked to higher 
total efficiency scores  18. The existence of DRS is demonstrated only for pub-
lic hospitals (21 LHA-hospitals and the two hospital trusts).
In general, we can conclude that most of the hospitals in Veneto are too 
small in relation to their output levels (i.e. IRS). This problem of scale inef-
ficiency, which is the first cause of the low total efficiency scores, character-
ises mainly the private hospitals (about 80% of the total of private DMUs: 
fourteen for profit and five non-profit)  19, while only 39% of the LHA-public 
hospitals (23 DMUs) exhibit a sub-optimal size. This result indicates the par-
ticular role of private hospitals within the Veneto health care system: these 
hospitals are considered important within regional health care planning, as 
providers of supplementary services integrating public supply, even though 
they operate at a sub-optimal scale.
The previous conclusion is confirmed by Figure 3, which shows the rela-
tionships between the level of scale inefficiency, measured by comparing effi-
ciency scores between model 3 and model 1 (e Sj  – ej), and hospital size, meas-
ured in terms of number of beds: the higher scale inefficiency is linked to 
IRS and to a small capacity. Out of the 28 hospitals with scale inefficiency 
above the average (i.e. above 11.8%), 25 show IRS and 20 have less than 
18 Among the 33 hospitals with a total efficiency score under 70%, 29 exhibit IRS, three 
show CRS and only the LHA-public hospital U68 shows DRS. Moreover, almost all the inef-
ficiency of U68 derives from a lack of demand. On the contrary, among the 39 hospitals with 
total efficiency above 70%, DRS are found for 28, IRS for 17 and CRS for four units.
19 For one non-profit and six for-profit hospitals, inefficiency depends only on an inef-
ficient scale.
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200 beds. In contrast, only three units with scale inefficiency above the aver-
age have more than 200 beds and show DRS.
Table 3 also reports internal efficiency scores obtained with model 4 and 
demand inefficiency levels, that is, the second component of external inef-
ficiency determined by an excess supply with respect to satisfied demand. 
Including an exogenous demand variable among the inputs has a noticeably 
positive impact on the efficiency scores, especially for many LHA-public hos-
pitals (37 DMUs) and for some accredited private hospitals (nine for-profit 
and five non-profit) which can be considered as complementary to pub-
lic services and which operate under the strict control of regional and lo-
cal health authorities. Fourteen hospitals become fully efficient moving from 
model 3 (scale efficiency) to model 4 (internal efficiency). Among these hos-
pitals, eight units exhibit a demand inefficiency index (e Ij  – e Sj  ) higher than 
10%: five LHA-public hospitals (U68, U75, U44, U53, U10)  20; two non-
profit private hospitals (U71 and U20); and one for-profit hospital (U38). As 
might be expected, all these DMUs are located in mountainous and/or low 
population density areas.
External inefficiency (measured by e Ij  – ej), due to non-optimal scale and/
or to exogenous demand, is the only component of total inefficiency for 34 
20 The effect of excess supply with respect to demand has a very strong impact on hospi-
tals U68 (with 54.5% of demand inefficiency) and U20 (with 42.1% demand inefficiency).
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FIG. 3. Relationships between external scale inefficiency and hospital bed capacity.
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hospitals (22 public). Twenty of these hospitals (13 public) exhibit only scale 
inefficiency and no demand inefficiency; therefore, we can conclude that, 
for these DMUs, low total efficiency scores can be better explained by past 
decisions made by policy-makers concerning the size of the hospital (this 
is mainly the case of LHA-public hospitals) or its role within the regional 
health care service (this is the case of some accredited private hospitals par-
ticularly involved in regional health care planning). Other 14 hospitals (9 
public) exhibit both scale and demand inefficiency, but – owing to our par-
ticular choice of the non-controllable demand variable (the additional input 
x5), as we explained in section 4 – in this case we cannot surely state that 
this inefficiency is completely external, as the actual demand could be par-
tially influenced by managers’ behaviour (e.g. a low demand determined by 
a low quality of provided services). Anyway, only for 7 out of 14 hospitals 
(5 public) demand inefficiency represents the most important component of 
external inefficiency while for the others it represents a negligible source of 
inefficiency.
In other words, for a large proportion of hospitals characterised by ex-
ternal inefficiency, it seems reasonable to attribute total technical inefficiency 
to external factors that are not (completely) within the control of the hos-
pital management such as: a) regional health care policy decisions made in 
the past which determined both choices of non-optimal sizes and an excess 
of hospital bed capacity in relation to actual demand  21; b) regional planning 
decisions deliberately aimed at guaranteeing the spread of hospitals across 
the territory, as it is considered unacceptable from a social viewpoint to de-
prive people living in peripheral and in sparsely populated areas (particularly 
in mountainous districts) of essential services.
Figure 4 represents the relationship between external scale inefficiency 
and external demand inefficiency. The dotted lines indicate the average level 
of the two components of inefficiency: respectively 11.8% and 4.5%. The 
figure shows that a large number of hospitals (31) exhibit both scale and de-
mand inefficiency levels that are lower than average, while only three hospi-
tals (one public: U62; two private: U38 and U71) show very high levels both 
of scale and demand inefficiency.
Table 4 shows the correlation coefficients between each pair of six dif-
ferent measures of hospital inefficiency: 1) increased inefficiency due to the 
introduction of a restriction on the virtual weights of y1; 2) scale inefficiency; 
3) demand inefficiency; 4) external inefficiency (given by the sum of scale 
21 Current regional health care policies tend to eliminate, or to limit, this excess supply 
even though they often face significant political obstacles.
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and demand inefficiency); 5) internal inefficiency; 6) total inefficiency (given 
by the sum of internal and external inefficiency).
The first column of the table shows the correlation between the in-
creased inefficiency due to the restriction on y1 weight and the other types 
of inefficiency. The highest positive correlation (27%) is found with demand 
inefficiency since the effect of the constraint of y1 weight is stronger (i.e. 
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FIG. 4. Relationships between external scale inefficiency and external demand inefficiency.
TAB. 4. Correlation coefficients between inefficiency levels
(1)
Increased 
inefficiency
(2)
Scale 
inefficiency
(3)
Demand 
inefficiency
(4)
External 
inefficiency
(5)
Internal 
inefficiency
(6)
Total 
inefficiency
(1)
Increased inefficiency 1.0000
(2)
Scale inefficiency –0.1424 1.0000
(3)
Demand inefficiency 0.2697 –0.0171 1.0000
(4)
External inefficiency 0.0030 0.8780 0.4636 1.0000
(5)
Internal inefficiency –0.2138 –0.0485 –0.0946 –0.0883 1.0000
(6)
Total inefficiency –0.1363 0.6888 0.3189 0.7631 0.5764 1.0000
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very low weight on acute care discharges in model 1) for hospitals which 
also exhibit higher demand inefficiency. The fifth row shows that there is a 
very low negative correlation between internal and external inefficiency (less 
than –9%), so that we can say that the hospitals with internal inefficiency 
are generally different from those characterised by external inefficiency. Fi-
nally, the last row shows that total inefficiency is mostly correlated with ex-
ternal inefficiency (76%) and in particular with external scale inefficiency 
(69%).
It could be interesting to investigate whether the inefficiency scores are 
correlated with some characteristics of the analysed hospitals. To this pur-
pose, many authors regress DEA scores on a set of potential explanatory var-
iables. This approach is criticised by Simar and Wilson (2007) that argue that 
DEA scores are serially correlated and suggest a new statistical procedure 
based on specifying explicitly the data generating process and bootstrapping 
to obtain confidence intervals. In order to avoid this methodological issue, 
we do not attempt to develop a strict causality model, and we restrict our-
selves to a simple analysis of the correlation between the six different meas-
ures of hospital inefficiency (described in Table 4) and the following hospital 
characteristics:
– the type of hospital;
– the number of beds;
– the case-mix index, to account for the complexity of discharges;
– the rotation index (number of patients that use one bed in a year, cal-
culated as the ratio between the total number of discharges and the number 
of beds), to account for the rate of utilisation of hospital capacity.
Table 5 reports the average inefficiency measures for each type of hospi-
tal, showing that:
– for-profit hospitals do not increase their inefficiency when the weight 
restriction on y1 is introduced: in fact, as explained before, all these hospitals 
attach a very high weight to the discharges adjusted with DRG;
– LHA-public hospitals exhibit a total inefficiency lower than the aver-
age; both internal and external inefficiency are important in worsening their 
performance;
– public hospital trusts are the less inefficient and their only source of 
inefficiency is given by decreasing returns to scale;
– private hospitals are more inefficient than public ones; for-profit hospi-
tals are mostly characterised by scale inefficiency (27.05%), while non-profit 
hospitals are characterised by all the sources of inefficiency: scale (17.3%), 
demand (10.16%) and internal (12.06%) inefficiency.
Table 6 reports the partial correlation coefficients between inefficiency 
measures and the considered hospital characteristics, showing that:
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– compared to LHA-public hospitals: only non-profit private hospitals are 
noticeably more likely to be totally inefficient; both hospital trusts and private 
hospitals (especially for-profit ones) are more likely to be scale inefficient; for-
profit hospitals are considerably less likely to be demand inefficient; both hos-
pital trusts and for profit hospitals are less likely to be internally inefficient;
– the growth of inefficiency due to the introduction of the weight restric-
tion is lower when hospitals are private  22, with a large number of beds and a 
high rotation index;
– a higher case-mix index exhibits a high negative correlation with both 
scale inefficiency and total technical inefficiency;
– a high rotation index is associated with a strong reduction in all the 
types of inefficiency.
These results partially confirm the findings of many DEA models, show-
ing that public provision of hospital services exhibits in general less inef-
ficiency than private provision (for a survey of these empirical studies, see 
Hollingsworth, Dawson and Maniadakis, 1999)  23. On the other hand, pre-
vious results of DEA models for Italy are sometimes different (a complete 
review of these studies is provided by Canta, Piacenza and Turati, 2006)  24, 
22 As we have shown before, y1 represents the most important output for all for-profit 
hospitals.
23 A recent work by Steinmann and Zweifel (2003) on the level of inefficiency of Swiss 
hospitals finds that private hospitals do not seem to be significantly less inefficient than public 
ones. The two authors remark that this result may be caused by the over-use of inputs (valued 
as amenities by patients) by private hospitals and they point out that this represents an impor-
tant limitation in applying the purely quantitative criteria of DEA to hospitals.
24 For example, Cellini, Pignataro and Rizzo (2000) find that private or public owner-
ship does not play a significant role in explaining differences in Italian hospitals’ efficiency. 
Likewise, Barbetta and Turati (2001) do not find a significant impact of the ownership struc-
ture on efficiency, considering a sample of hospitals located in Lombardia. On the other hand, 
Galizzi, Navarra and Vassallo (1999), considering a sample Italian hospitals for three years, 
TAB. 5. Average inefficiency measures by type of hospital
(1)
Increased 
inefficiency 
due to 
restrictions on 
y1 weight
(2)
Scale 
inefficiency
(3)
Demand 
inefficiency
(4)
External 
inefficiency 
(2 + 3)
(5)
Internal 
inefficiency
(6)
Total 
inefficiency 
(4 + 5)
LHA-Public Hospitals 4.01 6.94 4.36 11.31 9.84 21.14
Hospital Trusts 3.38 6.91 0.00 6.91 0.00 6.91
Non-profit Private hospitals 3.16 17.30 10.16 27.46 12.06 39.52
For-profit Private Hospitals 0.00 27.05 3.10 30.16 7.12 37.27
All Hospitals 3.12 11.82 4.48 16.30 9.24 25.55
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even though, similarly to our analysis, several studies have found an average 
high degree of total technical inefficiency (Cellini, Rizzo and Pignataro, 2000; 
Fabbri, 2000; 2003) and a higher total efficiency of hospital trusts compared 
to LHA-public hospitals (Fabbri, 2000; 2003; Giuffrida, Lapecorella and Pi-
gnataro, 2000).
In the case of hospitals in Veneto, the relatively lower efficiency exhibited 
by accredited private hospitals depends on two main reasons. Firstly, a very 
high proportion of non-profit and (especially) for-profit hospitals are charac-
terised by scale inefficiency. Secondly, many private hospitals (especially the 
non-profit ones) exhibit a relatively lower case-mix (accounted for by output 
y1), since they deal especially with long-term and low complexity in-patient 
care which is characterised by DRG tariffs above actual costs. These results 
indicate that the role of accredited private hospitals in Veneto is often com-
plementary to public services.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have examined two possible directions of refinement 
of the DEA as a method for evaluating the relative technical efficiency of 
acute hospitals. First of all, since hospital services operating within an NHS 
are generally given high social value, hospital technical efficiency should be 
find that private hospitals exhibit higher efficiency scores than public ones. Other works have 
investigated the effects of the reform of Italian NHS (in particular the introduction of the 
DRG-based payment system after 1995) on hospitals efficiency, finding evidence of an increase 
of public hospital efficiency (Fabbri, 2000) and a convergence in the mean level of efficiency 
between public and not-for-profit hospitals (Barbetta, Turati and Zago, 2007).
TAB. 6. Partial correlation coefficients between inefficiency levels and hospital characteristics
(1)
Increased 
inefficiency 
due to 
restrictions 
on y1 weight
(2)
Scale 
ineffi-
ciency
(3)
Demand 
ineffi-
ciency
(4)
External 
ineffi-
ciency
(5)
Internal 
ineffi-
ciency
(6)
Total 
ineffi-
ciency
Dummy-Hospital Trusts 0.1386 0.1344 0.0180 0.1340 –0.1161 0.0093
Dummy-Non-Profit Private hospitals –0.1698 0.1772 0.0761 0.2080 0.0288 0.2124
Dummy-For-profit Private Hospitals –0.3337 0.3052 –0.1512 0.1926 –0.1833 –0.0025
Number of beds –0.1814 –0.0507 –0.0889 –0.1022 0.1169 0.0204
Case-mix index 0.1240 –0.3802 0.1205 –0.2864 –0.1936 –0.4141
Rotation index –0.3583 –0.5405 –0.2952 –0.6159 –0.3542 –0.7271
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evaluated in relation to the preferences expressed by local and/or national 
communities through their elected representatives. For DEA, this means im-
posing constraints on input and output weights that are consistent with the 
preferences of the relevant policy-maker. Weight restrictions are based on 
modifications of the basic unbounded DEA model, in order to incorporate 
value judgements in the assessment of efficiency without eliminating a cer-
tain flexibility (freedom) vis-à-vis the value attached by hospitals to input 
and output variables. Secondly, we have shown how the assumption of VRS 
(variable returns to scale) and the inclusion of a demand variable among the 
inputs of the DEA model permit identification of how much inefficiency is 
due to factors outside the control of hospital management, such as past po-
litical decisions determining excess production capacity in relation to actual 
demand.
Based on these theoretical considerations, we have analysed the relative 
technical efficiency of hospitals in Veneto by using four models of DEA. 
Firstly, we find that the imposition of a lower bound of 70% on the virtual 
weight of acute care discharges weighted by case-mix (in order to encapsu-
late regional government objectives) reduces average efficiency from 74.5% 
to 71.3%; in fact, 26 hospitals worsen their efficiency levels because they at-
tach too much importance to other outputs, such as day hospital care and 
emergency treatment.
Then, by assuming VRS and considering the impact of non-controllable 
demand on hospital efficiency, we show that, in many cases, low efficiency 
scores are attributable to external factors, which are not fully controlled by 
the hospital management. The problem of scale inefficiency characterises 
mainly the private hospitals (about 80% of the total of private hospitals ex-
hibits increasing returns to scale), while only 39% of the LHA-public hos-
pitals (23 DMUs) exhibits a sub-optimal size. The second source of external 
inefficiency (the shortage of demand) is important for many LHA-public hos-
pitals (37 DMUs) and for some accredited private hospitals (nine for-profit 
and five non-profit). In general, for 34 hospitals (22 public) external ineffi-
ciency is the only component of total inefficiency. For these DMUs, low total 
efficiency scores can be mainly explained by past policy-makers’ decisions on 
the size of the hospitals or their role within the regional health care service.
Finally, both non-profit and for-profit private hospitals exhibit a higher 
level of total inefficiency than public hospitals: for-profit hospitals are mostly 
characterised by scale inefficiency, while non-profit hospitals are affected by 
all different sources (both internal and external) of inefficiency.
Despite some limitations of the empirical analysis (due to the lack of in-
formation on out-patient services and on quality of hospital care), this paper 
represents a preliminary attempt to adapt the DEA method to the particular 
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features of the hospital sector. It analyses the implications of modifying the 
basic DEA model in order to consider the impact on the measurement of 
hospital performance of both demand variables and policy-maker objectives 
to be pursued via specific restrictions on weights. Both these changes have 
noteworthy policy implications. Firstly, since measurement of hospital rela-
tive efficiency with DEA should be based on particular value judgements, the 
evaluation process of productive performance should be transparent, with an 
explicit definition of restrictions on input and output weights according to 
policy-makers’ choices. These restrictions are crucial for specification of the 
DEA model in which the policy-makers should be involved, directly or in-
directly. Secondly, the adoption of corrective actions aimed at increasing ef-
ficiency requires a distinction to be made between internal and external inef-
ficiency. In fact, reducing the two types of inefficiency calls for different in-
terventions: at hospital management level (for internal efficiency) or at health 
care planning authority level (for external efficiency).
Since there is no all-purpose method for considering the influence of de-
mand and for translating policy-maker objectives into restrictions on weights, 
these could be fruitful areas of development for future research.
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Measuring Hospital Efficiency through Data Envelopment Analysis when Policy-makers’ 
Preferences Matter. An Application to a Sample of Italian NHS Hospitals
by Vincenzo Rebba and Dino Rizzi
Summary: In this paper we show how both the choice of specific constraints on out-
put weights (in accordance with health care policy-makers’ preferences) and the considera-
tion of exogenous variables outside the control of hospital management (and linked to past 
policy-makers’ decisions) can affect the measurement of hospital technical efficiency using the 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Considering these issues, the DEA method is applied to 
measure the efficiency of 85 (public and private) hospitals in Veneto, a Northern region of 
Italy. The empirical analysis allows us to verify the role of weight restrictions and of demand 
in measuring the efficiency of hospitals operating within a National Health Service (NHS). 
We find that the imposition of a lower bound on the virtual weight of acute care discharges 
weighted by case-mix (in order to consider policy-maker objectives) reduces average hospital 
efficiency. Moreover, we show that, in many cases, low efficiency scores are attributable to 
external factors, which are not fully controlled by the hospital management. Finally, we show 
that accredited private hospitals exhibit a higher level of total inefficiency than public ones: 
for-profit hospitals are mostly characterised by scale inefficiency, while non-profit hospitals are 
affected by different sources of inefficiency. Most of the hospitals in Veneto are too small in 
relation to their output levels (i.e. are characterised by IRS) and this problem of scale inef-
ficiency characterises mainly the accredited private hospitals. This result indicates that private 
hospitals are considered important within regional health care planning as providers of sup-
plementary services integrating public supply, even though they operate at a sub-optimal scale.
Keywords: hospital performance, technical efficiency, data envelopment analysis, National 
Health Service.
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